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Abstract 
This article says that climate shaped the long-term pattern of economic change 
in India and that the climatically conditioned economic change generated a 
distinct set of environmental consequences in the region. From the nineteenth 
century, political and economic processes that made scarce and controlled water 
resources more accessible to more people, enhanced welfare, enabled more food 
production and sustained urbanization. The same processes also raised water 
stress. These propositions carry lessons for comparative economic history and the 
conduct of discourses on sustainability in the present times. 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Climate is an under-researched concept in economic history, an oversight that 
looks odd against the growing restlessness over climate change all over the 
world. In popular discourse, climate change has an economic past: the burning of 
fossil fuel to sustain excessive consumption led to irreversible changes in the 
earth’s weather pattern. The environment-economy connection tends to be seen 
through the lens of the tragedy-of-the-commons when unrestricted rights to 
exploit a common resource leads to its degradation. This stylized narrative does 
not capture some of the fundamental ways that economic change in the tropical 
                                                          
∗ I wish to thank the organizers and participants of two events where parts of the paper were 
discussed. These are, ‘Rural pluri-activity: how long did it last? Local dynamics in global 
perspectives,’ panel at the European Congress of Rural History, Paris, September 2019; and  
conference on the Global History of Capitalism, Oxford University, September 2019. 
Conversations with Gareth Austin, Kenneth Pomeranz, and Kaoru Sugihara have been helpful. 
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regions impacts the environment. One of these ways consists of making scarce 
underground water cheaper and more easily accessible to more people. Making 
water more widely accessible enhances welfare, raises production, and sustains 
urbanization. Paradoxically, the same action potentially leads to a condition 
known as ‘water stress.’ Not capitalistic greed, but welfare and developmental 
policies cause environmental stress. 
 
I argue in this paper that water extraction played a role in shaping long-term 
economic change in tropical monsoon regions, as important a role as fossil fuel 
extraction played in the economic emergence of Western Europe. I also argue 
that, in turn, the water-dependent economic change gave rise to a specific form of 
environmental stress that cannot be understood in the tragedy-of-the-commons 
framework. 
 
I draw on Indian history for 150 years. India in the colonial times (c. 1857-1947), 
or mainland South Asia in the modern times, broadly falls in a climatic zone 
called the tropical monsoon. Tropical monsoon is a combination of two conditions. 
One of these is above-average heat. The heat causes faster evaporation of surface 
water, making mobilization of water for cultivation, industrial use, and 
consumption a costly activity. The heat also makes for the hydrologic cycle that 
produces a powerful monsoon. The second condition is seasonality. The conduct 
of agriculture under tropical monsoon conditions was marked by extreme 
seasonal fluctuations in the pace of economic activity, because of the 
concentrated occurrence of most rainfall. During a short busy time of year, 
capital and labour were fully employed. During the rest of the year, wages fell, 
labour became surplus, and capital awaited the busy season. 
 
These two environmental conditions, water-shortage and seasonality, shaped 
rural poverty. So did institutions that shaped access to water sources. Together, 
these ‘filters’ modified the impact of the big drivers of global economic change 
since the nineteenth century – colonialism, commodity trade boom, migration, 
railways, public works, and technological change. Making productive use of these 
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drivers depended on how severe water shortage and seasonality were, and what 
could be done to mitigate these. For example, the prospect of exporting 
agricultural commodities would not offer a similar opportunity to a water-
deficient area and a water-scarce one. These climatic filters did not equally 
influence all parts of the South Asian mainland. For example, the seaboard was 
considerably less dependent on agriculture, being service- and manufacturing-
based, and usually received more rainfall on average thanks to the trajectory of 
the monsoon wind. The interior of mainland South Asia was exposed to these 
conditions to a greater extent. 
 
The time-span for this paper is 1850-2000. Barring temporary disruptions like 
the ENSO (El Niño-Southern Oscillation), the climate changed little in the past 
centuries. What, then, was different during these years? The answer contains 
two parts, of which one concerns water and the other seasonality. The tropical 
monsoon climate made access to controllable (seasonally constant) sources of 
water relatively expensive in the past. This resource was usually privately 
owned, with exclusion rules embedded in cultural practice, so that most poor 
people lived on seasonally variable supply from the commons. From this 
baseline, state investment in irrigation, urbanization, political movements for 
equality, and advancements in hydraulic engineering turned controllable sources 
of water for agriculture and consumption into a public and semi-public good, 
enabling a huge rise in the capacity of the economy to grow food, sustain 
population growth, and generate urban growth. While these effects unfolded, a 
type of environmental crisis known as water stress began to build up. Water 
stress occurs when groundwater is taken from relatively small or unknown pools, 
a condition very common in the tropical world today. 
 
The seasonality story goes as follows. From the time we have data to measure 
seasonality (say, monthly interest rate movements, available from the 1880s), 
the degree of the seasonal effect was far higher in India than in any temperate 
zone country.1 The only effective mitigation to seasonality is a reallocation of 
                                                          
1 See discussion in Roy, ‘Monsoon and the Market for Money.’ 
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capital and labour between livelihoods and regions that face the problem on 
different scales. The data to test how effective reallocation was are limited. We 
do know that seasonal short-distance migration increased since the late-
nineteenth century and that there was some convergence in interest rates over 
time. Mitigation took the form of institutional changes that made labour more 
mobile between different types of work contracts and capital more mobile 
between fields of investment. Until the mid-twentieth century, after which the 
state controlled the capital market, the effects were modest. Neither the wages 
nor interest rates converged much. 
 
Throughout, I use two phrases often, water access and water stress. Increasing 
water access refers to the process of water becoming a public good provided by 
the state, as opposed to being provided by private means and communities or 
gathered from the commons. Water stress refers, narrowly, to the situation when 
the withdrawal of water compromises sustainability, and broadly, to the 
situation when withdrawal causes conflicts and disputes.  
 
The rest of the paper has five parts, the framework of analysis, historiography, 
the water narrative, the seasonality narrative, and the seaboard situation. In the 
concluding section, I return to some implications of the study for comparative 
economic history. 
 
 
2 Framework of analysis 
What is the tropical monsoon climate? To answer the question, I compare 
temperature and rainfall in a temperate-zone place (London) with a tropical 
monsoon zone one (Delhi). In an average year, the maximum temperature in 
Delhi is about twice as high as that in London for every month of the year and 
exceeds 36 degrees celsius from mid-April to end-June (Figure 1).2 In an average 
                                                          
2 WATCH (Water and Global Change) datasets. 
http://www.waterandclimatechange.eu/evaporation/average-monthly-1985-1999 (accessed 19 
October 2019).
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year, rainfall in Delhi is concentrated in three months, owing to its dependence 
on the monsoon winds, leaving the rest of the year drier (and hotter) compared 
with the temperate zone. The monthly average rainfall in London varies in a 
range of approximately 40-70 mm. The monthly average rainfall in Delhi varies 
in a range of 10-250 mm. In Delhi, 75 percent of the rains occur during the third 
quarter of the year; in London, quarterly rainfall ranges between 21 and 31 
percent. 
 
What do these data mean? First, the extreme heat in the tropical region dries up 
surface water. The average evaporation rate is a function of (among other 
variables) available surface water and the heat from the sun. During summer in 
the Himalayas or the Arctic, the rate reaches very high levels. In the deserts, the 
rate is very low around the year. If in any one region the rate is high in one 
season and low in another, that would mean that plenty of surface water exists 
in some months and that all this water dries up completely in certain other 
months. In most parts of India, the rate reaches 60-100 mm per month in June-
September when the monsoon rain occurs in combination with high heat. As 
surface water dries up, the rate falls extremely quickly. By April-June, the rate 
(0-20 mm) that prevails in nearly all of India except the Bengal delta and the 
southernmost regions of the peninsular like Kerala tends towards the range that 
characterizes the great deserts of the northern hemisphere. On both sides of the 
North Atlantic, the range is narrower and the average higher throughout the 
year, meaning that more surface water withstands the summer temperature. 
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Figure 1. Maximum temperature (Celsius) and average monthly rainfall (mm) in 
Delhi and London. 
 
 
 
 
These facts suggest that livelihoods in a tropical monsoon climatic region would 
need to address two issues that do not appear with the same force elsewhere. 
Because surface water dries up quickly, leaving little available in the dry 
months, agriculture and survival would require mobilizing water over long 
distances or mining it from below ground or relying on the seasonally variable 
common sources. The first two options are ordinarily expensive and the third 
uncertain. Second, there was usually one short season of economic activity in the 
tropical monsoon region. This season fell not on the rainier months, but early in 
the winter, when the rain-fed crops came into the market. This season was busy; 
that is, wages and interest rates rose to high levels. The slack season was very 
slack; that is, wages and interest rates fell, as labour was in surplus and capital 
idle. All agricultural societies experience seasonality; the tropical monsoon 
regions experience extreme degrees of seasonality. 
 
In the past, and the absence of any artificial irrigation, the monsoon rains made 
one sowing relatively easy in most parts of India. The usual practice in the 
nineteenth century was to have two sowings in the monsoon, of which one was a 
major grain. In some regions, a weak winter monsoon enabled a second and 
minor crop. Growing any of the major grains in winter or some of the profitable 
year-round crops like sugarcane depended on irrigation that required harvesting 
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and storage of water on a large scale. Thus, the monsoon in a tropical region 
made earning subsistence easy, but improvements in yield difficult. 
 
The tropical monsoon agriculture was, therefore, a cause of poverty. It was a 
cause of poverty by making agricultural intensification an almost impossible 
challenge without outside help. Drawing water outside the rainy season is 
expensive in the tropical monsoon region. Canals were costly, and not always 
reliable unless taken from rivers that carried water throughout the year. 
Calculations made in the late nineteenth century suggested that the cost of 
constructing a well in the Deccan Plateau was relatively high, and the chance of 
getting enough water from a well relatively low.3 
 
The tropical monsoon climate was a cause of poverty also by enforcing idleness 
upon the rural workers. The average peasant ‘has five months hard work. If he 
has a share in a well, he is busy for three more months,’ said a Punjab officer in 
1926.4 He was right. Data collected during the Agricultural Labour Enquiry for 
the Indian Union (c. 1950) showed that the agricultural labourer in Punjab 
worked for about 155 days on the farm, and 20 days off-farm.5 Similar low 
numbers appeared from nearly all regions of India except the eastern part of the 
Indo-Gangetic Basin, deltaic Bengal, and Assam. And even in these regions, the 
working year rarely exceeded 250 days. As the citation says, the possession of a 
well increased work intensity by about 60 percent. Well is an example of what I 
call a controllable source of water, as opposed to seasonally variable sources. 
Since a well was usually a private good, wells reduced poverty but increased 
inequality. 
 
Most people in the countryside were water-poor. Such poverty manifested in a 
variety of ways, extra time spent (usually by women) in gathering water for 
consumption, dependence on unsafe water and disease risk, unavailability of 
                                                          
3 Roy, ‘Agrarian Crisis in Interwar India.’ 
4 India, Royal Commission on Agriculture, Vol. VIII, 71. 
5 India, Agricultural Labour Enquiry. 
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water for agriculture in the dry seasons, and outright famine risk when the rains 
failed. Extreme seasonality became a life and death issue if two successive 
monsoons failed or the monsoon and the winter rains failed in the same year. 
India witnessed a series of famines in the nineteenth century, some of the worst 
ones occurring in the first half of the study period. These famines involved an 
occurrence of rainy days below the long-term annual average. These events had 
devastating effects upon agricultural labourers, tenants and poor farmers in the 
dry Deccan Plateau. 
 
These conditions were not the legacy of regimes that ruled this land in the last 
two centuries. Recent national income estimates for periods before 1850 confirm 
that India was a considerably poorer place than Western Europe before the 
Industrial Revolution began.6 These studies do not explain why it was a poor 
place for centuries. The only plausible answer is environmentally-enforced low 
yield and unemployment of resources.  
 
What mitigating actions could those living in the countryside take to reduce 
poverty and famine risk? Migration and transhumance were a response to 
famines and seasonal water shortages. But these moves carried costs, and for the 
majority of the agricultural population with interest in a fixed plot of land, other 
mitigation strategies would be necessary. The most secure form of mitigation 
would be creating access to controllable sources of water. A controllable source is 
a rechargeable source where the owner can harvest water and recycle water 
throughout the year at will. An example is a well, tank, or a lake. Any other 
source, like streams and ponds, is susceptible to climatic actions, that is, dry up 
for some months of the year. Common resources were not always unreliable. 
When a river or a stream received snowmelt water, as in the case of the 
Himalayan rivers that enabled the formation of the Indo-Gangetic Basin, the 
seasonal evaporation cycle was weaker. Outside that zone, and even within it, 
most rivers and streams tended to shrink in the dry seasons. 
                                                          
6 Broadberry, Custodis and Gupta, ‘India and the Great Divergence: An Anglo-Indian 
Comparison of GDP per capita, 1600–1871;’ Roy, ‘Economic Conditions in Early Modern Bengal.’ 
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About 1850 in India, water came from fixed sources (wells, bandharas or earthen 
dams, tanks), as well as flowing ones (rivers and streams). Fixed pools of water 
were usually privately or communally owned. The most secure form of supply 
came from masonry wells, almost always privately owned. In almost everything 
else, the level of water supply varied by season. Manmade lakes and tanks were 
far too expensive for local communities and needed state effort. Public welfare 
was rarely the objective of kings and chiefs building waterworks in the 
countryside. David Mosse has shown how the management of water-works in 
South India served to maintain the authority of the social leaders more than it 
served welfare or profitability.7 
 
Entitlement to water, in short, was segregated and unequal. As far as we can 
gather based on nineteenth-twentieth century descriptions of almost any Indian 
village, seasonally secure sources of water were usually privately owned. The 
exclusion rules that applied to these private goods were embedded not only in 
property rights but also in cultural practice. From the late-twentieth century, 
applied development economics, which started taking an interest in the 
provisioning of public goods and the interaction between state and caste, as well 
as social researchers observed a correlation between being of the upper castes in 
an Indian village and having piped water or ownership of masonry wells, and 
being oppressed castes and dependence on segregated and poorer quality water 
sources.8 The oppressed castes would rely on a poorly constructed well or rivers 
and lakes that the upper castes did not use. Exclusion from fixed sources 
entailed a denial of the right to own and cultivate the land, for land control 
without water control would mean little. In this way, water rights reinforced 
poverty and inequality. 
 
In the long run, drawing water from underground or mobilizing water over the 
ground could lead to ‘water stress.’ The World Bank defines this as the 
                                                          
7 Rule of Water. 
8 See discussion of the literature in Iversen, Kalwij, Verschoor and Dubey, ‘Caste Dominance and 
Economic Performance in Rural India.’ 
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withdrawal of freshwater as a percentage of renewable freshwater supply. In 
2016, levels of water stress ranged from 42 percent in India to 105 percent in 
Pakistan in 2016; the levels were considerably lower in the UK (10), USA (22), 
Japan (28), and China (30) (Figure 2). There is a close across-country correlation 
between average temperature and water stress, suggesting that the water stress 
pattern was a feature of world geography rather than being anthropogenic.  The 
estimates of average renewable stock available for future or sustainable 
exploration are also very low for the South Asia region and add to water stress 
(Figure 3). 
 
Elements of the tropical monsoon conditions existed in other geographies. We 
should still be careful not to place all tropical regions and all monsoon regions in 
one basket and start doing large-scale global history. The world’s dry regions are 
not alike. Nor are the world’s monsoon regions. The Sahel has a monsoon like 
India’s, but a weaker one.9 Both regions face a high seasonal cost of accessing 
water. This is a distinct problem from the aridity that characterizes the regions 
north of the Sahel. India cannot be compared with monsoon-dependent East Asia 
either, because South Asia is way hotter than East Asia, besides being much 
more water-stressed (see below and Figure 2). 
 
How can the conditions of material life start to improve in a tropical monsoon 
climatic region like this one? How might such improvement impact the 
environment? In the next section I discuss scholarships that connect geography 
and economic change to see if we can find useful answers to these questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 The mean annual rainfall in the Sahel is 100-300 mm, that in India 300-650 mm. 
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Figure 2. Water stress (columns, percentages, left-hand axis) and average annual 
temperature (celsius) by selected countries. 
 
 
Source: World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.H2O.FWST.ZS (accessed 19 
October 2019). Also World Resources Institute, https://www.wri.org/resources/charts-
graphs/water stress-country (accessed 15 October 2019). 
 
Figure 3. Average Renewable Water Supply (cubic m/capita/year 2015) 
 
 
Source: Pacific Institute, https://www.worldwater.org/ (accessed 15 October 2019). 
 
 
3 Why climate matters 
A now-defunct tradition in comparative economic history laid stress on water. 
Karl Marx, Karl Wittfogel, and Fernand Braudel included water in their theories 
of the oriental state and society. All three believed that water control was a 
crucial matter in drier Asia, required expensive technologies that could only 
exist as a public good, and therefore water supply explained forms of state 
authority. Their main evidence came from canals built out of rivers in China, 
12 
 
India, Mesopotamia, and Egypt. This literature, notwithstanding its interest in 
water, is not useful for the paper. 
 
First, these writings presumed that water was a public good and a field of public 
investment. Whether this was or was not the case is not verifiable for India, and 
the claim is probably wrong. In India, imperial states did not own water-works 
on a large scale except in and near the capital city. States sometimes constructed 
water-works, as the fourteenth-century Tughlaq king of Delhi Feroz Shah did, 
but rarely regulated their use. Most states instead lived on local water resources. 
It is now generally accepted by Indianist historians that despotic empires never 
existed in India. Even the bureaucratic and centralized Mughal Empire relied 
too much on local power to behave like a despot. In such a decentralized state 
system, the local magnates that built waterworks were distinct from the kings 
and emperors, and their investment in, say, tanks or canals, do not implicate the 
power of the king, but a check on kingly power. In any case, Wittfogel et al. 
discussed water-works in the context of their construction and not that of usage 
or consumption. 
 
Second, what these authors were really after was a theory of the state, not 
environmental history. If the states were as strong in Asia as to regulate water 
in a dry region, the societies were comparatively weak – and changeless. It then 
follows from this analysis that Asiatic society was changeless in comparison with 
the dynamism of preindustrial Europe, and therefore, real history in Asia began 
with the arrival of the Europeans. ‘Those small and extremely ancient Indian 
communities,’ Marx wrote, ‘some of which have continued down to this day, are 
based on possession in common of the land, on the blending of agriculture and 
handicrafts, and on an unalterable division of labour.’10 Braudel had an almost 
identical reason for being interested in wet rice cultivation, which to him ‘implies 
a stable society, state authority and constant large-scale works.’11 The image of 
inertia has been persistent in world history and is carried over into present-day 
                                                          
10 Marx, Capital, Volume I, 513-5; see also Engels, Anti-Duhring, 228-9. 
11 Cited by Moore, ‘Capitalism as World-ecology.’  
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writings about Indian history, for example, into Eric Jones’ ‘indestructible atoms’ 
that composed India, the atoms including ‘village agriculture’ and the ‘caste 
system.’12 
 
Some older and recent versions of comparative economic history acknowledge a 
potential role for nature and climate, usually via a random selection of 
attributes. A contribution to institutional economic history argues that tropical 
pathogens had some role in the making of European colonial policy in these 
lands.13 Others stress the population-resource ratio.14 The main interest of these 
works is not the environment nor livelihoods, but the consequences of European 
expansion into Asia, Africa, and the Americas. This paper is not concerned with 
the process of European expansion. I believe that economic historians greatly 
exaggerate the importance of the European peoples and their colonial rules in 
the history of the tropical regions. The propositions advanced in this paper 
reinforce that belief. 
 
The environmental history of the tropical world does discuss climate, in so far as 
the nineteenth and early-twentieth-century discourses on forest conservation 
expressed worries over climate change.15 Except for this curiosity, the 
scholarship has been mainly interested in the relationship between European 
colonialism and the forests and commons of the tropics.16 Much of this 
scholarship considers that the relationship was disruptive for the tropical 
environment. Any such claim requires the historian to develop a credible picture 
of the precolonial. On that point, ignorance rules, and because ignorance rules, 
there is often a tendency to start with an untested belief in ‘the ecological 
                                                          
12 Jones, The European Miracle, 193. Global economic historians do not usually talk about the 
Indian caste system in a precise meaning. 
13 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, ‘Colonial Origins of Comparative Development.’ 
14 Pomeranz, The Great Divergence. 
15 Ravi Rajan, Modernizing Nature. 
16 There are good surveys of imperial regulation of the commons. See, for example, Rangarajan, 
‘Environment and Ecology Under British Rule,’ and ‘Introduction’ in Grove, Damodaran and 
Sangwan, eds., Nature and the Orient. 
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wisdom of non-industrial peoples who have ordered their activities in ways that 
maintain harmony with the environment.’17 
 
The tranquil precolonial enhances the drama of a collapse caused by colonialism 
and capitalism. After 1800, ecosystems collapsed, regulations and laws destroyed 
the commons or preserved these for state use, forests in India and Africa no 
longer being under community or self-management, degraded. Is this the true 
picture? The answer depends on the soundness of the image of a tranquil 
precolonial. Many historians have observed that the default reading of the 
precolonial overstates harmony.18 Water reinforces the point. As I show, the 
premise of a pre-colonial that was either tranquil or equitable fails when we 
consider allocation of water rights in the past times. 
 
I need to distinguish my usage of tropical monsoon from monsoon Asia, a concept 
that the development economist Harry Oshima made popular in the 1980s.19 
Oshima was explaining the economic miracle experienced by Northeastern Asia 
(including Japan, but excluding China). The concept of monsoon Asia builds on 
‘three major characteristics of monsoon paddy agriculture: the pronounced 
seasonality, the great labour-intensities of planting and harvesting, and the 
intricacies of traditional monsoon paddy cultivation.’20 Together, these features 
made for a poor peasantry employed for half the year on-farm. The high 
seasonality made labour-force utilization the critical problem to solve in such 
societies. The premodern societies solved it by combining farming and non-farm 
activity and achieving high degrees of employment intensity. A post-war 
                                                          
17 Robert Harms, cited by Beinart, ‘Empire, Hunting and Ecological Change in Southern and 
Central Africa.’ 
18 For a strongly worded critique of the myth of the ‘eco-golden-age’ in relation to water access in 
rural India, see Krishan, ‘Water Harvesting Traditions and the Social Milieu in India.’ See also 
Rangarajan and Sivaramakrishnan, eds., India’s Environmental History. Similar arguments 
were made for other colonized regions. ‘[M]uch environmental research on Africa,’ writes a paper 
on Tanzania, ‘treats the pre-colonial period as a baseline in which [the] natural environments were 
literally “undisturbed”.’ Hakansson, Widgren and Borjeson, ‘Introduction: Historical and Regional 
Perspectives on Landscape Transformations in Northeastern Tanzania.’ 
19 Oshima, Economic Growth in Monsoon Asia. I should mention here another work that has 
stressed the importance of climate in a historical way, Amrith, Unruly Waters. This insightful 
book does not engage in economic history in the sense I do in this paper. 
20 Oshima, ‘Transition from an Agricultural to an Industrial Economy in East Asia.’ 
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industrialization policy involved intensive use of labour in industry and was thus 
consistent with these resource conditions, and yet was an advancement on it. 
 
Although the concept of monsoon Asia and that of the tropical monsoon used 
here share an emphasis on seasonality, they differ on the emphasis on water, 
which was a far bigger problem for South Asia than for East Asia. If this was the 
case, then two conditions of the model of monsoon Asia did not apply to India – 
high labour-intensity of cultivation, and the availability of off-farm work. 
Dryland India did not cultivate rice. And if no cultivation is possible at all for 
seven months in a year, the condition would depress local demand for non-
agricultural goods so much as to make extensive off-farm employment unlikely. 
 
In the 1970s and the 1980s, economists often compared India and Japan. The 
development thinking of the time assumed that, since both countries were poor, 
agricultural, and monsoon-dependent in the nineteenth century, the subsequent 
divergence between these two countries on economic growth was a puzzle to be 
explained. The unstated assumption was that whatever Japan could do, India 
could do just as well, but for its state, colonial past, lack of land reform, or caste 
system. Oshima falls into this trap when speaking about India from the 
perspective of Japan.21 Raymond Goldsmith thought that the nineteenth-century 
Indian economy had more strengths than the Japanese economy. Their 
subsequent divergence, therefore, was a mystery, implying that India’s 
colonialism should somehow explain the mystery.22 
 
These comparisons and conjectures tell us little. The two countries had radically 
different geographies. Rainfall, temperature, and evaporation cycle data confirm 
                                                          
21 According to Oshima, the ‘slow growth’ of India – another monsoon Asiatic region – had owed 
to inappropriate policy choices, and its ‘socialist/caste institutions,’ a concept not defined, 
‘Transition from an Agricultural to an Industrial Economy,’ 809. 
22 Consider this: ‘If a percipient and knowledgeable economist, for example, John Stuart Mill or 
Karl Marx, had been asked in 1870 whether a century later India or Japan would be more 
advanced economically and financially and thus closer to the levels of Western Europe and North 
America, it is possible, and indeed likely, that he would have named India. .. Neither Mill nor 
Marx would ever have envisaged the abysmal difference that marks the observed economic and 
financial development of the two countries.’ Goldsmith, Financial Development of India, Japan 
and the United States, 4-5. 
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this conjecture by suggesting that whereas much of India (like the Sahel) is an 
arid region with a short and sharp monsoon added, Northeast Asia is a 
temperate region with a protracted and flatter monsoon added. On temperature 
and rainfall, Tokyo resembles London more than it does Delhi (Figure 4). Both 
water-shortage and seasonality were features of India to a much greater extent 
than they were of Northeast Asia. To reinforce the point, I add China and Japan 
as well as some representative north Atlantic countries in the climatic and 
geological data charts (Figures 2 and 3). 
 
Figure 4. Maximum temperature (Celsius) and average monthly rainfall (mm) in 
Delhi and Tokyo. 
 
 
 
 
Geography and natural resource endowments in the poorer countries have 
played a significant role in development economics and policy discourses. From 
the time these scholarships began, there was a singular fixation with land and 
little awareness that land counted for little without water. This fixation reached 
a peak around the 1970s and the 1980s when the belief that the key to solving 
the problem of rural poverty was a redistribution of land or property rights 
became an article of faith. ‘[W]ith great scarcity and an unequal distribution of 
land,’ writes one survey of the policy and the ideology behind it, ‘[land reform] 
received top priority on the policy agenda at the time of the Indian Independence 
in 1947.’23 Prominent Indian economists and European analysts of India 
                                                          
23 Ghatak and Roy, ‘Land reform and Agricultural Productivity.’ 
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endorsed this preoccupation. ‘Ownership of land,’ wrote K.N. Raj, ‘determines to 
a considerable degree .. the range of choices effectively open to different members 
of agrarian societies.’24 The Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal said of India that 
‘[t]o own the land is the highest mark of esteem; to perform manual labour, the 
lowest.’25 Consistent with these premises, analytical works on agricultural 
change in the poorer world stayed focused on market-relations and landed 
property rights, and rarely considered climatic-geographical variables. 
Explanations of ‘backwardness’ and synthetic surveys and overviews continued 
with this formula.26 
 
The recipes that followed from the land fetish in development economics were 
outlandish. The land fixation meant staying focused on the quantity of land 
distributed from the rich to the poor. The water data shown in the previous 
section suggest that rural poverty owed more to the quality of the land, a joint 
outcome of shortness of the season of limited employment because of uneven 
distribution of water over seasons, and high cost of mobilization of water. It is 
easy to see that the quality problem could be so serious as to make any reform of 
property rights to land practically irrelevant, without a water property reform at 
the same time. 
 
The criticism is so obvious that the land fixation seems like a very odd habit for 
economists working in or on a tropical monsoon country like India. A possible 
answer to the puzzle is that early development economics unthinkingly recycled 
an Anglo-centric disregard for water into their analyses of water-scarce 
developing countries. A misplaced belief in the universal validity of the laws of 
economics meant that theorists who wrote for water-rich geography were 
thought to be just as relevant to the water-poor ones. If David Ricardo did not 
                                                          
24 Raj, ‘Agricultural Development and Distribution of Landholdings.’ Cited text in p. 7. 
25 Myrdal, Asian Drama, 1057. 
26 For example, Bhaduri, The Economic Structure of Backward Agriculture, which offers a 
general theory of agricultural backwardness using class power. Ha-Joon Chang says why radical 
property right reforms worked for East Asia, generalizing the insight to the rest of the poorer 
world. See the two essays in an overview type work, both conspicuously neglectful of geography, 
Chang, ‘Institutions in Economic Development,’ and Byers, ‘Agriculture and Economic 
Development.’  
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mention water in the Principles of Political Economy – which he did not, in fact – 
it could become hard for an Indian economist trained in England in the 1950s to 
mention water.27 
 
In the late-1970s, the focus of development discourses in India shifted from land 
to labour. In part, this was an effect of the surplus-labour models of development 
and attempts to measure the social opportunity cost of labour.28 And in part, it 
was a response to the occurrence of near-famines in the late-1960s, and the 
spread of unrest and revolutionary movements in the countryside. In the 
backdrop of a growing sentiment that both redistributive land reforms and 
industrialization had failed to generate sufficient employment in India in the 
previous two decades, a team of researchers began to study ways of increasing 
employment intensity in the village. The team observed that per hectare labour 
inputs in agriculture differed significantly among countries, and that lower 
labour input was associated with higher poverty. The team concluded that there 
was unutilized scope for creating employment in rural areas. If this utilization 
were indeed possible by introducing small changes in technology and market 
access, it would offer a path to tackling rural poverty that was easier 
institutionally speaking than the land reforms and cheaper financially than 
industrialization. The study team led on the Indian side by K.N. Raj drew 
comparisons with Japan, where Shigeru Ishikawa showed, labour absorption in 
agriculture was especially high.29 
 
The initiative died in the next decade, partly because the Green Revolution was 
beginning to push up rural wages and encouraged interregional migration. In my 
view, it died for another reason as well. It had underestimated the 
environmental obstacles to raising employment intensity in the Indian 
                                                          
27 India’s ancient intellectual tradition has not been so blind to the quality of land problem. 2400 
years ago, an adviser to a Maruyan king asked the king to avoid land fixation, saying that the 
quantity of land captured during invasions was no measure of a successful rule, the quality of 
land was. ‘Which is better for colonization: a plain or watery land?’ Kautilya asked. The answer 
to that rhetorical question was obvious. ‘A limited tract of land with water is far better than a 
vast plain.’ Arthashastra. 
28 Harberger, ‘On Measuring the Social Opportunity Cost of Labour.’ 
29  Ishikawa, Labour Absorption in Asian Agriculture. 
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countryside and drew a superficial comparison between Japan and India without 
regard to their vastly different climatic conditions.30 
 
A more recent strand in development policy discourses dealing with 
sustainability has been mindful of water though not equally mindful of economic 
history. One of the sources of inspiration for the sustainability literature is the 
problem known as the tragedy of the commons. The tragedy of the commons as 
generally understood in ecology and economic theory occurs when many people 
exploit a common property resource leading to a bad outcome, implying that 
certain old rules of exploitation that could provide good outcomes – what Garrett 
Hardin called ‘social arrangements that produce responsibility’ – were given up 
in the process.31 What I describe in this paper is not that. I describe a set of old 
rules that sanctioned segregation of water rights and provided a bad welfare 
outcome but a sustainable environmental one. Breaking these rules was a good 
thing – certainly no tragedy – if risky. Societies faced a trade-off between welfare 
and environment when it came to water. The tragedy of the commons is a not the 
right model to reveal that trade-off. 
 
The tragedy of the commons makes the current water discourse in the tropics 
futuristic. The scholarship is preoccupied with the reverse causality, how 
economics is expected to impact ecosystems, rather than how ecosystems 
impacted economic change in the past. One strand in the literature focuses on 
population growth, which is a historical variable but did not seriously matter to 
the environment before 1910.32 The Indianist counterpart of the sustainability 
literature is mindful of the potential imbalance between supply and demand for 
water, but again with its main focus on the reverse causality.33 While limitedly 
                                                          
30 A cluster of writings on African development stress geographical barriers to agricultural 
intensification and trade. See Bloom and Sachs, ‘Geography, Demography and Economic Growth 
in Africa.’ There is some overlap between these writings and the present paper in the 
characterization of arid agricultural conditions, but not a lot of overlap. The accent in this paper 
on seasonality and institutionally conditioned access are not present in the Africa scholarship. 
31 The cited text from Hardin, ‘Tragedy of the Commons.’ 
32 Gleick, ‘Water in Crisis: Paths to Sustainable Water Use.’ 
33 Several essays in Shah and Vijayshankar, eds., Water; Chopra, ‘Sustainable Use of Water.’ 
Vijay Shankar, Kulkarni and Krishnan, ‘India’s Groundwater Challenge.’ 
20 
 
useful as a guide to economic history, the sustainability literature has done a 
service by making water stress an issue for mainstream policy debates, and also 
broadening the scope of the phrase. I will draw on some of these works in the 
next section. 
 
I now show how the modern times created increased water-security, but at a 
cost. 
 
 
4 The first climate story: Creating water access at a cost 
Before 1850, the access to controllable sources of supply of water was either 
private or restricted. From that situation, access increased in the long run, in 
turn, generating water stress. Figure 5 shows this relationship. The graph on the 
left shows the explanatory model, and the graph on the left uses a proxy each for 
water-access and water stress, to show with examples how the model might 
work. The second figure charts the canal-irrigation-percentage as a proxy for 
increasing access (I later explain why this is a good proxy), and per capita water 
availability as an index of water stress. The two lines cross as expected from the 
graph on the left.34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 This procedure can be questioned, because whereas the graph on the left suggest a causal link 
between water-access and water stress, the two indices shown on the right chart were technically 
independent. However, the message stands: water access increased in a vulnerable region, 
adding to the vulnerability in turn. 
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Figure 5. The expected relationship between water-access (solid line, left axis) 
and water stress (dotted line, right axis), and an example. 
 
 
 
Notes: The graph to the left shows the stylized relationship. The one to the right shows the 
percentage of canal-irrigated land as a proxy for the reduced barrier to access, against per capita 
availability of water in cubic metres, a proxy for water stress, coverage India and Pakistan. 
Sources: Tirthankar Roy, The Economic History of India 1858-1947, New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2022 on canal irrigation data; Per capita water availability from R.K. Mali, A. 
Gupta, R. Singh and R.S. Singh, ‘Water Resource and Climate Change: An Indian Perspective,’ 
Current Science, 90(12), 2006, 1610-26. 
 
 
Classical Hindu writings on statecraft and social conduct suggest that the rights 
to water entailed segregation cemented by ritual status rather than wealth 
inequality. Summing up almost a millennium of injunctions about caste, P.V. 
Kane said that ‘[i]n most of the works on the castes in India a few features are 
pointed out as the characteristics of the caste system.’ One of these is who could 
(or could not) take water from whom.35 The underlying idea was that water was 
not a sharable good, and rights were arranged by caste.36 The condition that 
these statements draw our attention to is that private right to water had a 
religious sanction, especially sanction from the ritual context, which drew an 
opposition between purity and pollution, and formulated the highly specific 
notion of differentiation based on the idea that purity was lost by touch or the 
                                                          
35 Kane, History of the Dharmashastra, Volume 2, Part I, p. 23. 
36 ‘A reservoir of water belonging to Chándálas is serviceable only to Chándálas, but not to 
others,’ Kautilya said in Arthashastra, 35. See also Joshi and Fawcett, ‘Water, Hindu Mythology 
and an Unequal Social Order in India.’ 
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exchange of bodily substances.37 This notion of purity made denial of water to a 
thirsty person a moral act. 
 
We cannot draw a line between classical texts and the historical process. There 
is, however, enough evidence to show that the coalescence of private rights and 
purity was present in the countryside in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.38 Was this a persistence of past practice? We cannot be sure, for 
research on the economy of the village has generally overlooked water rights and 
been preoccupied with land rights. When evidence does begin to come forth, 
exceptions to this norm were practically unknown. 
 
The first historically significant moment that underlined this connection was the 
Mahad Satyagraha of 1926, when a spontaneous movement emerged from the 
people forbidden from using a town’s public tank to assert their right to its 
water. Surely, such protests had happened before in history. But this event 
stands out for three reasons. First, it highlighted how universal the exclusion 
had been in western India until then. Second, it helped the emergence of B.R. 
Ambedkar in politics, who later became the most influential campaigner for 
caste equality. And third, the movement failed.39 
 
After independence from British colonial rule was achieved in 1947, the 
democratic state made a difference. But it did not eradicate exclusionary rights. 
A survey done around 1973 found that more than half the population of 
oppressed castes in the rural areas of Karnataka state was not permitted to use 
the public well or tank. The proportion was much smaller at 15 percent in urban 
areas. Similar levels of discrimination were also reported from other states and 
as late as the 1990s.40 In the early 2000s, one estimate reported that the women 
                                                          
37 Guha, Beyond Caste: Identity and Power in South Asia. 
38 A turn-of-the-twentieth-century Indian administrator and amateur ethnographer, Herbert 
Hope Risley, tried to conceptualize caste with reference to ritually sanctioned modes of sharing 
water. 
39 Omvedt, Dalit Visions, 44. 
40 Thorat, ‘Oppression and Denial: Dalit Discrimination in the 1990s.’ See also on persistence of 
water-discrimination, Johns, ‘Stigmatization of Dalits in Access to Water and Sanitation in 
India.’ 
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of oppressed caste households spent an average of three hours daily to gather 
water for the household.41 A 1990s survey found that whereas caste sentiment 
had been generally in decline in most areas of life, water shortage aggravated it. 
‘Untouchability is not experienced in normal times, but when water is scarce, the 
[oppressed castes] experience difficulty and discrimination in taking water from 
high caste localities.’42 
 
Data like these were collected only after the 1960s. It is possible to make two 
claims about history based on these contemporary descriptions. First, the levels 
of discrimination in the past were greater. Almost all of these statistics related to 
the village, implying that the town experienced weak discrimination. Surely, the 
exclusion would not easily work with piped water. If this were the case, then 
urbanization ratios, combined with the urban proportion of the oppressed caste 
population, should indirectly confirm the level of discrimination. In 1901, this 
joint proportion was considerably lower in India than in 2001.43 Second, it is 
plausible that instead of water-discrimination deriving from cultural sentiment, 
both discrimination and the cultural sanction that it received, derived from 
geographical conditions.44 Projected back to the past, the relationship between 
geography and water rights would mean that water-insecurity and 
untouchability were both more intense in the era before public provisioning of 
water took off, roughly, from the nineteenth century. 
 
From a grim baseline, water became more accessible, and more of a semi-public 
and eventually a public good during the period of this paper. Recent surveys of 
standards of living of the oppressed castes find that most families living in the 
                                                          
41 Phansalkar, ‘Water, Equity and Development.’ 
42 Thorat, ‘Oppression and Denial,’ 575. 
43 In 1901, 11 percent of the Indian population was urban. In 2001, 28 percent was urban. In 
2001, 20 percent of the ‘scheduled caste’ population was urban. India, Handbook of Social Welfare 
Statistics. The corresponding percentage for 1901 is unavailable. If we assume that the 
proportion rose at the same rate as the average urban ratio, then the 1901 percentage for the 
oppressed castes would be eight. However, it is also well-established that the oppressed castes 
had historically weaker access to education and capital; such resources should ordinarily raise 
the urban ratio. Therefore, the percentage in 1901 should have been smaller than eight. 
44 Bharti, ‘Wealth Inequality, Class and Caste in India, 1951-2012.’ 
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cities have access to ‘some form of communal running water supply.’45 In the 
countryside too, piped water extended, though the situation may have turned 
adverse during colonial times.46 
 
Beyond caste-based access data, the evidence is varied and often indirect. 
Colonial property rights reforms created strong ownership rights over land but 
left the right to the commons undefined. That oversight may have made the 
upper castes and elites more eager than ever to take control of the sources of 
water. But not all members of the political elite in the countryside could do this. 
Some of the biggest gainers from agricultural growth and commercialization both 
in the colonial and the postcolonial times were not members of the upper-castes 
in a ritual sense. The British colonial rule in India introduced several changes 
that weakened the link between water-control and fiscal intermediation. The 
village landlord who had a say on the use of the commons and performed a tax 
collector’s role in pre-colonial times turned into a specialist cultivator in the 
nineteenth century, as the colonial government took over the tax collection 
function. Some members of the upper caste landowning elite failed to adapt, or 
sensed other opportunities, and left the village for the city. 
 
Irrigation technology changed in the nineteenth century, with a large investment 
in canals taken off the rivers of Punjab and constructed in the south Indian 
deltas. With canal irrigation, individuals could do little to restrict access to other 
individuals. With globalization and expansion of commodity export trade, the 
less water-stressed seaboard played a larger role in driving economic change 
from the mid-nineteenth century, attracting migrants from the agrarian inland 
to the port cities and their hinterlands. The move entailed increased access to 
water per capita (and some mitigation of seasonality, as I argue later). It is 
almost certain that the disappearance of dryland famines in India after 1900 had 
                                                          
45 Martin, ‘Rural Elites and the Limits of Scheduled Caste Assertiveness.’ 
46 Economic power stemming from commodity trade concentrated in the hands of landowning 
castes, who sometimes came from the upper castes. Agricultural expansion encouraged some of 
these landowners to capture common streams. For examples of capture from the recent times, see 
Joshi, ‘Caste, Gender and the Rhetoric of Reform in India’s Drinking Water Sector.’ 
25 
 
a causal connection with mass water-security, though hardly any research exists 
on the connection. 
 
The cities of colonial India had an ambiguous relationship with water. Bombay, 
Calcutta, and Madras were not short of water sources. However, until the late-
nineteenth century, the city administration neglected drainage, sewage, and 
centralized water supply systems, increasing the risk of malaria and cholera, 
especially in the densely settled areas where the Indian population and new 
migrants lived. Water channels inside the cities tended to degenerate under 
population pressure. In the engineering corps of the army, there were advocates 
of gravity schemes that had found an application in the enormous canal projects 
of the same time. But many people doubted how receptive the Indian quarters of 
the cities would be to the idea of a common tap, and to paying a tax to get it. 
 
These fears were well-founded. In the 1880s, the pioneering industrialist of 
Ahmedabad, Ranchhodlal Chhotalal, was beaten up by members of his 
community for his campaign for water supply and drainage system in 
Ahmedabad.47 The resistance notwithstanding, the cities did develop gravity 
systems and piped water, thanks in part to the growing economic and political 
power of businesspersons like Chhotalal, and partly, a moral concern that 
originated in Britain and migrated to different parts of the empire. ‘At home and 
abroad,’ writes the author of a study of urban water supply in colonial India, 
‘rulers and reformers identiﬁed the same practical problems, the unhygienic 
habits of the working class or native city dweller, and the same abstract 
predicament, the moral degeneration of townspeople living among “ﬁlth,” and 
applied the same environmental solutions.’48 
 
In the late-twentieth century, urbanization speeded up. From 18 percent in 1951, 
the urban ratio exceeded 30 in the 2000s. The environmental sustainability 
scholarship acknowledges the positive link between urbanization and water 
                                                          
47 Roy, Business History of India, 113. 
48 Broich, ‘Engineering the Empire.’ 
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access.49 The two waves of the Green Revolution in India, a 1970s one based on 
wheat and a 1980s one based on rice, increased water access. Subsidization of 
electricity and subsidized bank credit for pumps made extraction of groundwater 
much cheaper than it would otherwise be. As agricultural production increased, 
the scale of subsidization grew too. 
 
As barriers to access fell, water stress rose. On a smaller and local scale, the 
dual-process had occurred in Indian history many times before 1850. Medieval 
cities like Fatehpur Sikri near Agra or Goud in Bengal were abandoned because 
rechargeable sources of water ran out. Urban growth, thanks to the low cost of 
extraction of water, led to overreliance on a fixed source and crises in the manner 
seen in other world regions before the modern times.50 But the process occurred 
on a larger scale from the late nineteenth century because it was mediated not 
by isolated urban growth but by agricultural expansion, irrigation development, 
and population growth. It was regionally variable. Making more water accessible 
to more people was technologically easier to achieve in the seaboard, the river 
valleys, the floodplains of the Himalayan snowmelt rivers, and wetland zones. It 
was a much harder process in the semi-arid Deccan Plateau. Between 1872 and 
1902, canals taken from Himalayan rivers in Punjab increased from 2,700 miles 
to 16,900 miles, enabling a rise in cultivable land from 27,000 to over 40,000 
square miles. In the peninsular regions, the growth in both was much smaller. 
 
Concern over rising water stress started in the second decade of the twentieth 
century when the study of economics and agronomy was institutionalized. There 
were three types of water stress. First, the irrigation canals that were taken 
from the Himalayan rivers sometimes degraded or created environmental 
hazards.51 Second, in the western part of the Indo-Gangetic Basin, where subsoil 
water was used for cultivation, groundwater reservoirs were depleting. In some 
                                                          
49 ‘[A]s India urbanises, the growing proportions of its population would come into contact with 
formal water service providers,’ which implies reduces barriers to access. Shah and  van Koppen, 
‘Is India Ripe for Integrated Water Resources Management?’ 
50 See Tana, ‘Towards an Environmental History of the Eastern Red River Delta, Vietnam.’ 
51 Whitcombe, Agrarian Conditions in Northern India, Agnihotri, ‘Ecology, Land Use and 
Colonisation: The Canal Colonies of Punjab.’ 
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tracts within this area, the uncertainty raised the cost of constructing a new well 
as well as the cost of extraction of water.52 And third, in the eastern part of the 
Basin as well as the Bengal delta, which mainly relied on the deltaic and rainfed 
rivers for subsistence and winter cultivation, there was beginning to occur a 
change in the morphology of the river system. Deltaic Bengal became fertile and 
retained fertility through a natural process, change of course of the rivers. In the 
monsoons, numerous small channels carried excess river water into depressions, 
turning them into tanks. As the tanks drained again, the dried-up tank-beds 
provided fields for rabi (winter-sown) crops. In some tracts, particularly in 
western Bengal, overexpansion of cultivation since the nineteenth century had 
started to restrain this twofold process, with the result that the soil surrounding 
the rivers had begun to deteriorate.53 An example of the manmade crisis was the 
Damodar river, which deteriorated into a narrow and fixed channel on reaching 
lower Bengal. In eastern Bengal, many agricultural tracts were said to be ‘dying,’ 
and the reason was that the tanks neither had enough water nor did they dry in 
time.54 In turn, this was a result of the silting up of the rivers, and the silting of 
the channels that carried river water. The tanks became swamps in the dry 
season and breeding grounds for mosquitoes carrying malaria. ‘There is little 
doubt that deltaic Bengal has become populated a geological age before its time, 
and the legacies of fever, deterioration of rivers, etc., is [Sic.] at least partly due 
to this.’55 
 
For at least forty years after India’s independence and the adoption of a statist 
development strategy, these pieces of evidence of the declining quality of surface 
water did not trouble the policy-makers too much. Nor was there a radical shift 
in the paradigm of hydraulic engineering. In the 1990s, however, water returned 
to the mainstream development policy thinking, and now as a major worry. The 
worry stemmed from growing evidence of depletion of groundwater thanks to the 
                                                          
52 India, Royal Commission on Agriculture, Vol. VII, Evidence taken in the United Provinces, 
377-9. 
53 For a contemporary discussion, see Mukherjee, The Rural Economy of India. 
54 Roy, ‘Agrarian Crisis in Interwar India.’ 
55 India, Royal Commission on Agriculture, Vol. IV, Evidence taken in the Bengal Presidency, 7, 
Director of Agriculture, Bengal. 
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overuse of the aquifers for agricultural uses. India’s rice-based Green Revolution 
of the 1980s was a success of food production, at an enormous environmental 
cost. Soil nutrients depleted in many cases, and groundwater was mined 
recklessly. 
 
Between 1995 and 2004, the proportion of the Indian population living in ‘unsafe’ 
districts – unsafe being defined as the declining capacity of the aquifers to 
recharge and to sustain current levels of water extraction – increased from 7 to 
35 percent.56 In the northern districts that had led the earlier wheat-based 
Green Revolution, exploitation of groundwater in the 1990s reached levels that 
far exceeded the capacity of the aquifers to sustain. Pakistan faced the same 
problem on a much bigger scale. Elsewhere, the hydrogeological conditions 
influencing supply varied too much to make predictions on future supply a 
simple matter. The main issue, however, was not the quantum of potential 
supply, but that groundwater appeared as a private good to the users, whereas it 
came from a common pool, the classic tragedy-of-the-commons syndrome. 
 
As the sense of an impending ecological crisis grew, water turned political. The 
generally rapid economic growth in India since the 1990s added the fear that 
non-agricultural demand for water was growing too fast. Again, the worry was 
the private exploitation of common resources. In the last 15-20 years, water 
conflict has grown in India’s mega-cities, where ‘a combination of institutional 
path dependence and a neoliberal restructuring’ has ‘extended the ability of [the 
cities] to establish new forms of water entitlement in rural and peri-urban 
areas.’57 
 
Hydro-political analysis grew alarmist at the same time. Within South Asia, 
which contains over a fifth of the world’s population and eight percent of global 
freshwater, and which relies critically on freshwater harvested from sources like 
                                                          
56 Vijay Shankar, Kulkarni and Krishnan, ‘India’s Groundwater Challenge and the Way 
Forward.’  
57 Punjabi and Johnson, ‘The Politics of Rural–Urban Water Conflict in India.’ 
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Himalayan snowmelt or underground sources, both resources the South Asian 
countries shared, the prospect of going to war over water is not beyond 
imagination.58 As of now, the nations of South Asia cooperate more than dispute 
their rights to riparian resources. But critics believe that the terms of 
negotiation reflect the economic weight of the nations more than ecological 
considerations.59 And the prospect of climate change shifts the geographical 
knowledge base on which some of the treaties were drawn.60 
 
Similarly, ‘the potential for political instability over domestic water distribution 
and development’ becomes increasingly real.61 A study of the Indus Basin shows 
that these conflicts do not directly stem from absolute scarcity, rather they are 
enmeshed in the discourses on entitlement to water, and relate to broader 
political processes such as ‘democratization, .. social justice, [articulation of] 
ethnic, religious, and linguistic identity,’ and perceptions of groups of claimants 
about justice and economic security.62 In short, a simple land-population-water 
accounting cannot explain the emerging conflicts at the local levels. These 
conflicts embed in beliefs that water is a democratic and human right, which 
some stakeholders violate at the cost of others. The mega-cities conflict 
mentioned above is another example of the problem. 
 
 
 
                                                          
58 Chellaney, Water: Asia’s New Battleground. 
59 Hanasz, ‘Power Flows: Hydro-hegemony and Water Conflicts in South Asia.’ 
60 The most famous international agreement in South Asia is the Indus Waters Treaty between 
India and Pakistan. Both countries rely heavily on the ﬁve major rivers of the Indus Basin for 
irrigation and power. All of these rivers originate inside India, and four of them ﬂow inside 
Pakistan. The Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 allowed Pakistan to exploit the Western rivers more 
intensively while allowing India rights to the Eastern rivers. Although the two countries often 
fought wars, the Treaty survived. Between 2002 and 2012, threatening words were exchanged 
over the Treaty. And in the recent months again, tensions rose. On the Treaty, see Ramaswamy 
R. Iyer,’Indus Waters Treaty 1960: An Indian Perspective,’ 16 March 2014, available at 
https://www.boell.de/en/2014/03/16/ indus-waters-treaty-1960-indian-perspective (accessed 2 
August 2016). On the Eastern borders, India’s decision to build a barrage on the Ganges on the 
Bangladesh border (1973-4) caused much uneasiness between the two countries. Comparatively 
speaking, river-sharing arrangements between India and Nepal, and India and Bhutan, were 
more peaceful. 
61 Mustafa, ‘Social Construction of Hydropolitics.’ 
62 Mustafa, ‘Social Construction of Hydropolitics.’ 
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5 The second climate story: Overcoming seasonality 
That extreme seasonality also means widespread underutilization of labour, and 
therefore, rural poverty is well-known. But seasonality is much more than 
poverty. It can shape labour market contracts and investment behaviour. 
Seasonality can be overcome. Migration and reallocation of labour and capital 
can mitigate its effects over time. 
 
How did seasonality shape contract? How did contracts change and why? Did 
mitigation happen in the 150 years of interest? I will focus mainly on the colonial 
era because that is where my expertise lies, and suggest that they did happen, 
but within strict limits. The key examples to show that mitigation happened are 
seasonal migration of peasants and agricultural labourers to non-farm work, 
which increased in scale, institutional changes that enabled such movements, 
and some narrowing of seasonal variation in interest rates. There was evidence 
of a narrowing of the gap between busy and slack season interest rates in India 
in 1874-1914.63 During the same period, inter-regional migration and circulation 
of labour also increased. However, neither did the average real wage rate 
significantly increase nor the average interest rate decline during the same 
years. So, what happened, and what were the limits? 
 
Let me first discuss what makes non-farm employment possible at all under 
conditions of high seasonality. A short productive season suggests that there is 
surplus labour. Should that be good news for generating non-farm employment? 
Not necessarily. Most people engaged in highly seasonal agriculture should have 
a lot of free time off-season or there should be a labour pool available for non-
farm employment at a very cheap rate. The prospect is good news for employers 
in industry and services. On the other hand, there being only one productive 
season, yields are low, marketable surplus small, and therefore, local demand for 
                                                          
63 The annual average of the bank rate of the Bank of Bengal fell slightly over 1874-1919, and so 
did the variation around the monthly rates. See Roy, ‘Monsoon and the Market for Money,’ 
Figure 1. 
31 
 
industry and services weak. That is bad news for prospective employers in non-
farm activity. 
 
When we observe any non-farm employment at all, we need to ask which one of 
these two pathways is working for that would tell us what is needed to generate 
more such employment. If local demand for non-farm goods is not a problem, 
then arranging for investments in industry should generate more employment 
utilizing cheap surplus labour. If limited local demand is a problem, then first 
demand has to rise via commercialization of agriculture and investments in 
agriculture before industrial employment can rise utilizing surplus labour. 
 
If demand is not a problem, and just the availability of surplus labour can 
generate non-farm employment, we should see a negative correlation between 
days of work in agriculture and days of work in non-agriculture among rural 
households. The shorter the agricultural season, the more do the peasants and 
labourers take part in nonfarm activity. We should also expect to see a negative 
correlation between average wage in agriculture and days of work in non-
agriculture. If local demand drives such diversification, we should see a positive 
correlation between days of work in agriculture and days of work in non-
agriculture, as well as a positive correlation between average wage in agriculture 
and days of work in non-agriculture. 
 
There is some data to test which way these relationships go. The 1954 
Agricultural Labour Enquiry collected data on days of gainful work in 
agriculture and non-agriculture across regions. The data related to one year and 
the wage-dependent people rather than landowners. Subject to these 
qualifications, they showed that seasonality was acute. The number of days of 
paid work on average was small (more than 100 days of idleness in all but two 
regions, see Figure 6 below). The data also show that the days worked in non-
agricultural activity was correlated positively with days worked in agricultural 
activity, though the correlation was not significant. The data finally show that 
the days worked in non-agricultural activity were again positively (but not 
32 
 
significantly) correlated with the average wage in agriculture. These results 
provide some support to the second of the two models, suggesting that merely 
having surplus labour was not a sufficient condition for nonfarm work to develop, 
the necessary condition was that rural incomes should grow first. The 
precondition for that would be actions mitigating the effects of seasonality. 
 
Between 1870 and 1920, agricultural production and trade did increase. Rural 
workers migrated more than before. Rural incomes did grow, not equally in all 
regions, and the peasants and workers did consume more non-food articles. 
Estimates of average cloth consumption suggest a significant increase from six 
square yards in 1840 to 15 in 1940.64 The extent of the increase in consumption 
could not just happen by relying on small urban demand for textiles. Peasants 
too bought more cloth and good-quality cloth. They did because, in some parts of 
rural India, incomes did grow with irrigation expansion and commercialization of 
agriculture. 
 
Figure 6. Days labourers worked in agriculture and non-agriculture, 1952. 
 
 
Source: India, Agricultural Labour Enquiry: Report on intensive survey of agricultural labour, 
vol. I (All India), New Delhi: Ministry of Labour, 1954. 
 
 
                                                          
64 Roy, ‘Consumption of Cotton Cloth in India, 1795-1940.’ 
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That process, however, did not make the rural labourers work harder and 
produce more craft goods. How do we know that the rural population did not 
supply the new demand for non-farm goods? Since the scale of non-agricultural 
employment was small in 1952, not much could have happened in the previous 
century. The big process that the rural workers were subjected to was 
institutional change, a change in the contractual form of employment. It did 
enable more reallocation of labour. But it was not a very radical change, driving 
agricultural labourers usually towards other forms of labour rather than towards 
industrial production. 
 
An argument that has become known as the land-abundance view of pre-colonial 
Africa suggests that an abundance of low-quality land and labour scarcity 
induced the emergence of regimes of labour coercion in precolonial Africa.65 In 
India, labour was always potentially scarce during the busy seasons, and land 
was by definition of low-quality thanks to the seasonal shortage of water. There 
was little outright slavery in India, but farm servant arrangements were indeed 
quite extensive in the dryland areas of southern India. 
 
There were four features of these farm servant arrangements. First, they were 
caste-based and often bordered on serfdom, if not slavery. The workers were 
attached to plots of land. For some groups, their caste status made for a weak 
entitlement to land and water; it made sense to enter year-round arrangements 
like this one. Second, servitudes of these sorts involved a lack of specialization. 
The workers were attached to the land, but in the slack season, they were 
available to work in a range of services. Third, these activities were not market-
driven or chosen by the servants but dictated by their employers. And fourth, 
these were manual and unskilled work, rarely involving more than the most 
basic tools and basic skills. Where artisanal activity was a part of the portfolio, 
such as weaving or leatherwork, the quality of the work was basic and far 
simpler than the work produced by specialist artisans. 
                                                          
65 Austin, ‘Cash Crops and Freedom,’ Fenske, ‘Does Land Abundance Explain African 
Institutions?’ 
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Farm servants in colonial India were not all alike. In colonial Madras, they 
belonged in castes that could not effectively own land. In Punjab, on the other 
hand, farm servants were cultivators on the side and worked under negotiated 
contracts. In some parts of central India, farm servants were like apprentices 
and a prospective groom for the daughter of the family.66 Significantly, Madras 
was the driest of these three examples around 1900. Despite these differences, 
there might be a single motivation behind these arrangements. To avoid a 
shortage of workers in the peak season, the employers offered a contract that 
carried a small wage but contained an implicit insurance element for those 
months when there was no work and less food.67 In areas like dry Madras, water 
shortage would add to the motivation on the part of the worker to get into long-
term contracts. Seasonality did not mean complete idleness in the slack months, 
it could mean instead performing a different range of tasks, or being available for 
any odd job. The farm servant worked as a non-specialized or ‘general labour.’68  
 
The 1881 census defined ‘general labour’ as persons who ‘take to miscellaneous 
tasks involving as little as possible of anything beyond bodily strength.’69 In the 
1960s, Daniel Thorner, who made the first serious effort to understand the 
nature of work in rural India, considered that this group consisted of agricultural 
labourers mainly.70 This interpretation left unexplained why women crowded 
general labour more than field labour. This group consisted of persons who did 
not specialize and moved between agricultural and non-agricultural labour, 
while always sticking to manual labour. Because women were necessarily non-
specialized workers, they were usually counted as general labour in the 
nineteenth century. 
 
                                                          
66 India, Census of India, Central Provinces and Berar, vol. XIII (Part I), 213. 
67 For an application to a later time, see Sanghvi, Surplus Manpower in Agriculture and 
Economic Development with special reference to India. 
68 Minding livestock was an important task. See Atchi Reddy, ‘Work and Leisure: Daily Working 
Hours of Agricultural Labourers.’ 
69 India, Census of India, Bombay Presidency, vol. I, 1881, 196. 
70 Thorner and Thorner, Land and Labour in India. 
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General labour was shrinking in scale in the late-colonial times, so much so that 
the census gave up this category from 1901.71 Consequently, the proportion of 
agricultural labourers in the rural work-force increased in the census period 
(1881-1931). Early Marxist readings of these data said that debt-ridden peasants 
were losing control of land. There is little direct evidence that this was the case. 
More plausibly, attached workers were moving around more, and non-specialized 
workers were turning into more specialized workers. The percentage of farm 
servants in 1901 or 1921 and the percentage of attached labour in 1951 moved in 
the range of 12-15. But the most hierarchical caste-based arrangements were in 
decline. In Madras, the proportion of farm servants among labourers fell from 
half in 1881 to about a third in 1931 to just one percent in 1951.72 After the 
1950s, official sources discarded the term ‘attached’ labourer on the ground that 
‘attached labour is no longer attached to any particular household in the old 
sense. Such attachments are now conditioned more by economic considerations 
and may not extend beyond a season or a year at the most.’73 
 
Increased migration possibilities and a fall in the costs of migration thanks to 
the railways induced contractual change. I believe that there was another factor 
at work. From the end of the nineteenth century, after famines dispeared from 
the dry lands, the population irrespective of social status would have experienced 
reduced barriers to access to water. More people than before would have access 
to the water-secure environments of the city or the deltaic regions. Therefore, 
one condition for entering year-round commitments – securing access to food and 
water if these things ran out in the dry season – did not operate as powerfully as 
it did before.  
 
Migration drove many men in farm households to go to the port city seeking 
work. The women who stayed behind joined farming work and sought more 
causal type of contract. That kind of intra-family reallocation of labour had an 
                                                          
71 Roy, Rethinking Economic Change in India: Labour and Livelihood. 
72 India, Agricultural Labour Enquiry, Vol. I (All India). 
73 India, ‘National Commission on Agriculture.’ Cited text on p. 65. 
36 
 
obvious connection to climate; if successful, it was very effective mitigation of 
seasonality. Migration opportunities also increased in the newly emerging 
agricultural regions like the Punjab, which did not have its traditional labour 
pool. Commercialization made people specialize. As rural consumption increased, 
the process benefited the specialist artisan more than the peasants and the 
agricultural workers. The specialist artisan gained from this change because new 
consumption goods being traded more widely embodied skills, and the general 
labourers or farm servants faced barriers to acquiring these skills. 
 
In parallel with these changes in the labour market, the capital market changed 
too. A rich commercial tradition, especially along the coasts, had created in India 
a large indigenous banking system before the British colonial empire appeared in 
the region. Colonialism and globalization, however, changed the structure of 
trading, and in turn, financing of trade. Unlike artisanal and high-valued goods 
traded in the past, from the mid-nineteenth century, agricultural commodity 
exports became the main item of trade, sustained by the railways, the 
telegraphs, the port city infrastructure, and indigenous banking. The entire 
financial system, including a nascent corporate banking segment, had to reorient 
to this new and vast field for deployment of money. 
 
Despite the rise of corporate banking, the core of the banking business became 
ever more tied to commodity trade, thus increasing the seasonal influence on 
their business rather than reduce it. The biggest of the indigenous banking firms 
funded export trade, funded other bankers, sometimes did some deposit 
business, and were somewhat less susceptible to seasonality. These firms were in 
the port cities. A key feature of their operation was the extensive use of 
negotiable instruments, especially a group of instruments collectively known as 
‘hundi.’ The common meaning of hundi was a banker’s draft or promissory note, 
though sometimes merchants’ bills of exchange were also called hundi. An 
important piece of British Indian legislation, the Negotiable Instruments Act 
(1881) partially covered hundi.74 The reputation of the acceptors as banking 
                                                          
74 Martin, ‘An Economic History of the Hundi 1858-1978.’ 
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houses and the customary law and conventions that they followed ensured that 
the corporate banks discounted the hundis they issued. The biggest of these 
banks were partially European owned and again in the port cities. The 
discounting of hundis, therefore, made for an area of convergence and 
cooperation between modern and traditional banking firms. In other words, their 
inherited institutional strengths and colonial legal intervention together helped 
these bankers expand their business. Some of the port city banks, therefore, 
managed to develop a sufficiently diversified portfolio to mitigate seasonality. 
 
Local banking was trapped ever deeper in seasonality. Neither hundi nor a 
diversified portfolio characterized those layers of banking that funded the 
merchants operating in the countryside, who moved goods by the railways from 
the source and lent money to landlords and peasants. The business of 
agricultural lending in the villages and small towns involved a very different 
institutional setup and different sets of actors from those described above. Even 
the large banking firms had some exposure to agriculture, but they rarely dealt 
with the peasants and local grain merchants directly. Those who mainly dealt 
with the peasants needed to adapt to extreme seasonality.75 
 
The monsoon concentrated rainfall into a two-to-three-month span in an 
otherwise hot and arid region, thus squeezing the sowing season, when peasants 
needed credit, and the harvest season, when the trade needed credit, into short 
periods, sometimes as short as two-to-three weeks. In the busy season, bankers 
needed to expand credit a lot and very quickly. Local banking adapted to the 
unpredictable fluctuations in demand in a variety of ways. They usually dealt in 
the most liquid of assets, such as cash and gold, made unsecured loans, relied on 
their knowledge of the clients, insisted on short-term loans, and avoided deposit 
banking, which would add a non-seasonal liability. The rest of the year was the 
slack season when the circulation of money in the countryside greatly reduced in 
extent. 
 
                                                          
75 For more discussion on the financial market, see Roy, A Business History of India. 
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It is not surprising, then, that despite the growth of their business, indigenous 
bankers rarely invested money in modern industries like cotton textile mills. 
Except for a few textile firms of Ahmedabad, industry tended to be financed by 
mercantile profits, public shareholding, and public deposits. And despite the 
growth of indigenous banking, the rates of aggregate saving and investment 
remained low in the early twentieth century. Indigenous bankers met the needs 
of agriculture but diversified little and had little noticeable effect on saving 
habits. Interest rates stayed high, much higher than in the money markets of 
Europe, and fell only marginally between 1880 and 1940. 
 
The reason is that, extreme seasonality limited financial intermediation.76 
Attracted by the prospect of making a killing in the busy seasonal market, 
lenders hoarded money rather than lend long-term outside agriculture. The 
persistence of huge inter-year fluctuations in interest rates was a sign that the 
banking business did not increase credit sufficiently in the busy season without 
running into unsustainable default and did not deploy surplus funds profitably 
in the depressed months. The money supply into the agricultural interior was 
not very elastic. Lenders in agricultural credit did not usually transact using 
negotiable instruments or bills. Their clients did not understand or accept 
papers, and the courts of law and discounting counters were too distant. The 
local financial markets dealt with only physical money. 
 
In part, the preference for cash over papers reflected the limited reach of laws. 
The acceptors of hundi were too remote and unknown to the merchants, 
moneylenders, and peasants engaged in local trade. Legislation on negotiable 
instruments was piecemeal in that it did not extend to local moneylending and to 
the contractual documents that were potentially usable in agricultural 
transactions (like promissory notes). A string of provincial laws restricting land 
mortgage obstructed the use of the mortgage document as a negotiable 
                                                          
76 Goldsmith found that the level of financial intermediation was relatively low in interwar India. 
Financial Development. Across emerging economies of the time, the level was not highly 
correlated with per capita income, even though all showed a rise in intermediation in the long 
run. 
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instrument. There were other hurdles to legislation. The diverse profile of the 
actors, many of whom were merchants and bankers of small resources, and 
immense variation in local conventions would have made designing a proper 
legal framework for bills a frustrating enterprise. Therefore, the financial system 
was poorly equipped to spread credit between seasons and types of borrowers. 
 
The subject of finance already brings us closer to the port city, where seasonality 
was a weaker effect. 
 
 
6 The seaboard where the climatic agency was weaker 
The seaboard was not a part of this story – water-access  increased production 
and wellbeing  water stress. Discussion of the concept of ‘monsoon Asia’ 
observed that the concept did not explain the economic history of Singapore and 
Hong Kong all that well. The reason it did not was that services and not 
agriculture were the economic foundation of many seaboard cities. So it was in 
India. Before 1850, trade and finance in the port cities did respond to the 
seasonality effect, for shipping needed to use the monsoon winds and avoid the 
monsoon storms. But the port cities were not water-scarce, thanks to higher 
rainfall in the coasts, and their ability to situate on estuaries and deltas where 
there was a constant flow of water even in rivers that tended to shrink in 
summer. They could grow bigger because they could provide food and water to 
more people. 
 
Outside the port city, towns had limited capacity to provide water. India’s 
urbanization ratio was low and stagnant as far as we can measure, until the 
mid-nineteenth century. There was nevertheless a reshuffle between the interior 
and the coasts that probably began in the mid-eighteenth century. For the next 
70 or 80 years, the three ports that the British East India Company had owned 
from the seventeenth century (Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras; Karachi joined 
them in the 1840s), grew rapidly in population, whereas several cities in the 
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formerly Mughal-ruled Indo-Gangetic Basin depopulated.77 The reshuffle was an 
effect partly of political shifts and partly the growth of Indo-European maritime 
trade in goods like indigo and opium. After 1850, technological change aided the 
process. Steamships were less reliant on monsoon winds and more able to 
withstand violent weather. The volume of rail borne trade increased very 
rapidly. Being able to carry the produce of many regions meant that the railways 
were busy throughout the year since local crops did not all follow identical 
seasonal cycles. Further, irrigation water had enabled the production of year-
round water-intensive crops like sugarcane, which again created business for the 
railways. Thus, if the seaboard had been less susceptible to the water constraint 
from before, it now had the means to overcome seasonality and do business all 
year round. 
 
In this way, urban business growth and agricultural growth started to diverge 
from the end of the nineteenth century.78 Agricultural growth gained from water 
access via irrigation projects, but as irrigation investment slowed in the 
twentieth century, the gains dissipated. After that, national income data show 
significant growth in real national income in 1900-1946 in non-agricultural 
activities like finance, industry, and trade, whereas agricultural income changed 
little. There was a near-doubling of productivity of labour in the former, and 
little change in productivity in agriculture. The mainstay of business growth was 
long-distance commodity trade. Cargo carried by the railways and the ports 
increased from 5 to 140 million tons between 1871 and 1939. Finance and 
banking expanded to support that growth. Merchants and trading firms invested 
trading profits in mechanized factories, especially cotton and jute textiles — all 
of these activities gained from the greater water-security of the cities. 
 
The balance between the seaboard and the interior changed after 1947. 
Independent India’s autarkic and statist development policy meant that some of 
the earlier businesses – commodity trade, foreign trade, and traditional industry 
                                                          
77 For the data, see Roy, Economic History of Early Modern India. 
78 The rest of this section draws on Roy, How British Rule Changed India’s Economy. 
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like the textiles – declined. The seaboard cities retreated in economic 
importance. The major cities, Bombay and Calcutta, experienced an extended 
period of urban unrest and de-industrialization in the 1970s and the 1980s. On 
the other hand, the rates of public saving and public investment increased 
dramatically and concentrated on heavy industries located in interior cities and 
on the subsidized provision of agricultural inputs. While Bombay and Calcutta 
retreated, interior cities like Bangalore and Bhopal forged ahead based on heavy 
doses of public investment in industry. Private and government efforts to 
mobilize water also increased as part of these policies. There was, in a general 
sense, a convergence between the interior and the seaboard as a result. The 
recent return of ‘neo-liberal’ economics in India may have caused a further shift. 
Towns that led business growth, and agriculture, reached crisis points. 
Bangalore city, for one example, is now severely water-stressed. 
 
 
7 Lessons 
The essay says that climate shaped the long-term pattern of economic change in 
India and that the climatically conditioned economic change generated 
environmental consequences in the region. The nineteenth-century forces that 
transformed the world economy – trade, technology, colonialism – worked 
through geography. And because geographic mediation varied within India and 
between livelihoods in India, these forces generated inequality. 
 
The environmental filters of interest are water shortage and seasonality. The 
water story in this paper is formally similar to how most of us think about the 
link between natural resources and politics or economics. Over a century or 
more, widening access to a finite resource – be it land, water, or minerals – 
causes shortages to build up, attempts to capture the resource, political onflicts, 
and environmental crises. But water is also unique in some ways. It is not, like 
cobalt in batteries, an instrument for the consumption of luxuries like phones 
and cars, but a necessary condition for life to exist. It sustains population growth 
and food production. Water security makes societies better-off in a more 
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fundamental way than would a growth in per capita income, whereas water-
security acts also as a precondition for per capita income to rise. 
 
This argument brings me to the subject of what economic history and 
environmental history can learn from a study like this one. On that point, I wish 
to make three general comments. 
 
The first set of comments concerns what economic historians often consider to be 
the yardstick of the economic success of societies, growth in average income or 
productivity. The paper tells us that this is a misleading yardstick. In a dry 
region, water-security should count as the biggest breakthrough for material life, 
not a rise in income or productivity. There are additional and more technical 
problems involved in ignoring water access or seasonality in an account of 
standard of living. For example, where per capita incomes are unavailable, 
economic historians use either real wage or consumption data to measure 
changes in standards of living in the long run. They need to consider that real 
wages are impossible to read for a tropical region unless accompanied with data 
on the effect of seasonality, that consumption of food has little meaning where 
water access is insecure, and that the same level of living measured in wages or 
consumption-bundles could mean variable risks to life. 
 
Second, the paper has a lesson on how economic historians choose their key 
questions and the key regions to compare in answering these questions. Many 
economic historians take for granted that the most important task for the 
profession is to answer the question, why some countries grew rich, and other 
countries stayed poor from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the 
present times.79 Having decided that this must be the central task, comparative 
economic history remains wedded to a Europe-Asia comparison that ends up 
being a celebration of Europe’s success in raising average income and goes on to 
explain the rest of the world’s failure to do so. But is the question – why some 
                                                          
79  ‘Why are some countries much poorer than others?’ Acemoglu and Robinson, ‘The Role of 
Institutions,’ 1, call this ‘the most important question’ for the social sciences.  
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countries grew rich, and other countries stayed poor – a good question? Is 
answering it with statistical data a good use of statistical data? Are Europe and 
non-Europe the right geographical units for comparison? I believe the answer 
should be no to all three questions. 
 
Long-run economic performance needs to be understood with other benchmarks 
than average income. Much of the world is dry. Western Europe, Japan, and 
North America are a lucky exception to that rule. For the rest of the world, the 
societies’ ability to control water determined their ability to sustain population 
and economic growth. The paper shows how water control can be a benchmark of 
economic performance with one example. The proposition that water-control 
should be a benchmark of performance frees up global economic history from the 
increasingly sterile and sometimes outlandish Europe-Asia comparison and 
enables comparisons among the drier regions. For example, the evaporation map 
of the world tells us that the arid tropics, the so-called monsoon Asia, and the 
monsoon tropics share some similarities and some differences in their ability to 
control water. Did their economic pathways differ too? Were these more similar 
than different? Did the differences stem from geography? 
 
My third and final comment concerns the tropes through which economists make 
sense of environmental history. Much of the ongoing discourses on 
environmental stress remains trapped in simplistic tragedy-of-the-commons 
rhetoric. The maxim that emerged from Hardin’s framing of the problem, that 
‘freedom in the commons brings ruins to all,’ does not apply to water stress in the 
tropical monsoon regions.80 Increasing water access involved deliberate 
democratization of rights to access and a change from the old rules that 
sanctioned segregation, inequity, and inequality. This is ‘freedom in the 
commons’ in a substantive sense but not in Hardin’s sense. It is freedom as freer 
access to a basic human entitlement, not the freedom to destroy. The equivalence 
of water access and human freedom suggests that dealing with this kind of 
environmental crisis is a more complex affair than environmental activists may 
                                                          
80 Cited text from Hardin, ‘Extensions.’ 
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think. In a dry region, there is a trade-off between welfare and the environment. 
The right response to that trade-off is not asking individuals to consume less.  
 
This history of India is an unfinished one and should gain from improvements in 
measurement and a better understanding of causal links. Much relevant 
climatic-geological data cited above comes from recent surveys because older 
data do not exist or historians did not look for them. Sometimes, the paper 
comments on institutional conditions in older times by extrapolating the results 
of recent studies that explore the link between ecology and economic change. 
Fortunately, geography does not change quickly. Even so, it would be much 
better to build data on the older times, on such benchmarks as water access, 
water stress, seasonal movements in wages and interest rates, and rise or fall in 
the degree of seasonal variations. 
 
Similarly, some crucial relationships are obscure. How premodern states set 
entitlements to water in practice; whether or not the entitlements mitigated 
famines or broke down during famines; how tenacious caste-based rights have 
been and why they have been tenacious; inequalities within castes; whether a 
concept of common pool existed in the times past; how the demographic 
transition from the mid-twentieth century complicated the story, remain some of 
the unexplored areas. 
 
Another unexplored theme is the nature of the interaction between external 
economic agents – trade, colonialism, technology, nationhood and citizenship 
rights – and water access and seasonality. Did these forces increase the 
dependence of the poor upon unreliable jobs and limited subsistence, or improve 
their access to better jobs and more reliable subsistence? Given the extreme 
degrees of water-exclusion that Indian society displayed throughout history, I am 
inclined to think that external forces like states, markets, and technologies 
would supply, in the net, more escape routes from social oppression, even if these 
factors consolidated some traditional forms of power. But this is only an 
informed guess.  
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